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Abstract
Nominal rigidities are generally viewed as important for the transmission of monetary policy.
We argue that nominal rigidities are important also for the transmission of technology shocks,
especially for explaining their eﬀects on hours and real wages. Evidence suggests that a positive
technology shock leads to a short-run decline in labor hours and a gradual rise in real wages. We
examine the ability of an RBC model augmented with real frictions, a pure sticky-price model,
a pure sticky-wage model, and a model combining sticky prices and sticky wages in accounting
for this evidence. We ﬁnd that, according to this metric, the model with nominal wage and price
rigidities is more successful than others. This ﬁnding is robust and holds true for a relatively small
Frisch elasticity of hours and a relatively high frequency of price reoptimization that are consistent
with microeconomic evidence.
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11 Introduction
A widely held view following the seminal papers by Gray (1976), Fischer (1977), Phelps and Taylor
(1977), and Taylor (1980) is that, rational espectations notwithstanding, nominal rigidities greatly
matter for the transmission of monetary policy shocks. This view is also shared by the recent DSGE
literature such as Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007), among
others. However, the real business cycle (RBC) revolution launched by Kydland and Prescott (1982)
suggests that business cycles are mainly driven by technology shocks, for which nominal rigidities
are of little relevance. Would this be true, macroeconomists would be left with a dilemma: diﬀerent
types of business cycle models would be well suited for the analysis of certain types of shocks, not
all.1
In a provocative study, Gal´ ı (1999) presents evidence that a positive technology shock leads
to persistent declines in hours. He argues that a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model incorporating sticky prices and a weakly accommodative monetary policy to the technology
shock accounts well for the evidence, while the standard RBC model does not. In response to Gal´ ı’s
(1999) critique of RBC models, Francis and Ramey (2005) show that an RBC model augmented
with real frictions in the forms of habit formation and investment adjustment costs can generate
a short-run decline in hours following a positive technology shock. Therefore, judging a particular
model based on its ability to deliver a fall in hours following a technology improvement does not
seem to be useful in assessing the empirical importance of alternative transmission mechanisms.2
In this paper, we argue that examining the joint dynamics of hours and real wages following
a technology shock helps better evaluate competing transmission mechanisms in diﬀerent models.
We ﬁrst summarize the empirical evidence on the responses of hours and real wages to technology
shocks. We show that, although the empirical studies diﬀer in their estimation methods, sample
periods, and identiﬁcation strategies, a consensus emerging from the empirical literature suggests
that, following a positive technology shock, hours decline persistently and real wages rises modestly
on impact and continues rising until reaching a new steady state level (e.g., Francis and Ramey,
2005; Basu, Fernald and Kimball, 2006; Liu and Phaneuf, 2007).
1See the early exchange between Summers (1986) and Prescott (1986).
2Christiano, Eichenbaum and Vigfusson (2004) provide evidence that a positive technology shock can lead to a
rise in hours if log levels of hours instead of log diﬀerences in hours enter the structural vector autoregression (SVAR)
model. Fernald (2007) oﬀers a plausible reconciliation between these apparently conﬂicting results. He shows that
if statistically signiﬁcant and economically plausible trend breaks in hours and productivity are accounted for, a
technology improvement unambiguously leads to a short-run decline of hours.
2We then examine the ability of a few alternative models in explaining the joint dynamics of
hours and real wages observed in the data. We show that an RBC model augmented with real
frictions may deliver a short-run decline of hours worked, but it also implies that the real wage
responds strongly to a technology shock in the impact period and thus fails to generate the observed
gradual rise in the real wage.
A sticky-price model similar to that studied by Gal´ ı (1999) also has diﬃculty in explaining
the joint dynamics of hours and real wages. With a relatively weak accommodation of monetary
policy to the technology shock, the sticky-price model can generate the short-run decline in hours.
However, we show that the same conditions that lead to a decline in hours also lead to a short-run
decline in the real wage, which is at odds with data.
We show that, in the sticky-price model, the sign of the real wage response on impact of a
technology shock is determined by three factors. The real wage will fall on impact of a technology
improvement if policy accommodation is not too strong, the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is
relatively small, and the strategic complementarity in ﬁrms’ pricing decisions is relatively strong.
This link between policy accommodation, the Frisch elasticity of hours and the decline in the
real wage can be explained as follows. With sticky prices, a low Frisch elasticity of hours and a
weak policy accommodation to the technology shock, the initial adjustments in consumption, and
thus in the marginal utility of consumption are small. With a decline in hours and a rise in leisure,
the marginal utility of leisure falls. Thus, the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and
consumption falls on impact, and so does the real wage. For the real wage to increase following a
positive technology shock, the degree of monetary policy accommodation to the technology shock
and the Frisch elasticity of labor supply needs to be high. But the Frisch elasticity of hours is low
according to micro level studies (e.g., Pencavel, 1985) whereas, the degree of policy accommodation
to the technology shock, as we later show, is low for the postwar U.S. period.
The diﬃculty for the sticky-price model to explain the real wage responses to technology shocks
leads us to extend Gal´ ı’s (1999) framework by including monopolistically competitive households
and sticky wages in our analytical model. In one version of the extended model, wages are sticky
and prices are ﬂexible. With sticky wages as the only source of nominal rigidities, we ﬁnd that the
real wage rises on impact of the technology shock, representing a step in the right direction relative
to the sticky-price model. Nonetheless, a pure sticky-wage model does not predict a decline in
hours worked. Since prices are ﬂexible, the technology shock leads to a one-for-one decline in the
price level and, in the absence of monetary policy accommodation (i.e., constant money supply), a
one-for-one increase in output with the productivity so that hours stay constant. If monetary policy
is partially accommodative to the shock, money supply increases and output rises even further so
3that hours also rise. Thus, regardless of the extent of monetary policy accommodation, the pure
sticky-wage model does not predict a fall in hours.
The model with both sticky prices and sticky wages can generate the observed joint dynamics of
hours and the real wage following a technology shock. The inability of a pure sticky-price model to
generate an increase in the real wage is amended by allowing some nominal wage rigidity. We show
that with sticky wages and sticky prices, a positive technology shock leads to a modest increase
in the real wage on impact, as observed in the data. This result is robust to various values of
the Frisch elasticity of labor supply and the degree of policy accommodation. On the other hand,
the inability of a pure sticky-wage model to generate the observed decline in hours is overcome by
introducing some nominal price rigidity, but then the degree of policy accommodation matters. If
monetary policy is weakly accommodative, hours fall when technology improves, whereas if policy
accommodation is relatively high, hours rise.
This leads us to examine whether monetary policy accommodation to the technology shock
has been high or low during the postwar period. To answer this question, we provide evidence
based on an examination of the relation between the U.S. money aggregates (M1 and M2) and two
alternative measures of technology shocks. One is Basu, Fernald and Kimball’s (2006) “puriﬁed”
Solow residual which controls for non-technological factors such as variable input utilization rates,
non-constant returns, and imperfect competition. The other is a measure constructed by Gal´ ı and
Rabanal (2004), who use long-run restrictions in a SVAR model to identify the technology shock.
With both measures, we show the degree of monetary policy accommodation to the technology
shock is weak at best. We conclude that both nominal wage and price rigidities are crucial to
understand the eﬀects of a technology shock on hours and the real wage.
We report one last substantive ﬁnding. We show that with a high frequency of price re-
optimization as suggested by recent micro level studies (e.g., Bils and Klenow, 2004; Klenow and
Kryvtsov, 2008; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008), the responses of hours and the real wage to a
technology shock implied by the model with sticky wages and sticky prices remain consistent with
empirical evidence.
Therefore, our ﬁndings and the recent strand of literature on the transmission of monetary
policy shocks both deliver a coherent message: nominal wage and price rigidities are of primary
importance for the transmission of monetary policy and technology shocks in DSGE settings.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes some empirical evidence about the
eﬀects of technology shocks on hours and real wages. Section 3 presents a real business cycle (RBC)
model with habit formation to illustrate the inability of an RBC model in capturing the observed
labor market responses to technology shocks. Section 4 develops a DSGE model with sticky prices.
4There, we derive closed-form solutions and assess the plausibility of the sticky-price model to match
empirical evidence on hours and real wages. Section 5 examines the role of sticky nominal wages
in the transmission of technology shocks. We begin with a pure sticky-wage model to illustrate the
mechanism and then assess the ability of the model with both sticky prices and sticky wages in
replicating the empirical evidence on hours and real wages. Section 6 presents evidence about the
extent of monetary policy accommodation to technology shocks. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Adjustments of Hours and Real Wages Following Technol-
ogy Shocks
Technology shocks are shown to be important for business cycles, not just in the RBC literature
but also in the recent DSGE literature (e.g., Smets and Wouters, 2007; Justiniano and Primiceri,
2008; Liu, Waggoner, and Zha, 2011).3 Woodford (2009) echoes the view that technology shocks are
important. He states that “it is now widely accepted that real disturbances are an important source
of economic ﬂuctuations,” whereas the view “that business ﬂuctuations can be largely attributed
to exogenous random variations in monetary policy has few if any remaining adherents.”
To document what happens after a technology shock, we summarize the relevant ﬁndings in
the recent empirical literature. We argue that, despite of diﬀerent estimation approaches, diﬀerent
sample periods, and diﬀerent identiﬁcation strategies, a consensus emerges from these empirical
studies concerning the responses of hours worked and the real wage to a technology shock.
A ﬁrst piece of evidence about the response of employment following a technology shock can
be found in the early work of Shapiro and Watson (1988) on SVAR models. Using quarterly U.S.
postwar data from 1951:1 to 1985:4, they estimate SVAR models in which long-run restrictions
serve to identify a technology shock. They provide two sets of estimates: one from a SVAR with
a stochastic trend in hours, and the other from a SVAR with a deterministic trend in hours. In
both cases, they ﬁnd evidence of a short-run decline of hours following a technology improvement.4
However, they do not discuss the implications of their ﬁndings for alternative macroeconomic
theories.
3Smets and Wouters (2007) report that productivity shocks explain more than 30 percent of the forecast error
variance decomposition of output at the 10-quarter horizon. Ireland’s (2011) estimates suggest that technology shocks
contribute to over 60 percent of output ﬂuctuations at the same horizon. Gal´ ı, Smets and Wouters (2011) establish
that productivity shocks contribute between 46 and 59 percent of the variance decomposition of output at the 10–
quarter horizon and between 32 and 40 percent of the variance decomposition of real wages. By any standards, those
are large numbers.
4See Shapiro and Watson (1988), Figures 2 and 5.
5Gal´ ı (1999) brings this consideration to the forefront of his analysis. Focusing on the sources
of the near-zero correlation between hours and labor productivity, he provides evidence showing
that technology shocks induce a negative correlation between these variables while non-technology
shocks trigger a positive correlation. These ﬁndings are obtained from estimated SVAR models
that identify a technology shock as the only disturbance aﬀecting the long-run level of labor pro-
ductivity. A technology improvement generates a short-run decline of hours and an increase in
labor productivity. According to Gal´ ı, the short-run fall in hours following a technology shock is
hardly reconcilable with the predictions of the standard RBC model, whereas it appears consistent
with the predictions of a new keynesian model featuring sticky prices and a weak accommodation
of monetary policy to the technology shock.
Basu, Fernald and Kimball (2006) also oﬀer evidence of a short-run decline in hours following a
positive technology shock using a ”puriﬁed Solow residual” controlling for non-technological factors
that may aﬀect measured total factor productivity. While their approach does not require the use
of long-run identifying restrictions, their ﬁndings are nonetheless consistent with Gal´ ı’s results:
technology improvements have short-run contractionary eﬀects on employment.
Gal´ ı’s (1999) approach has been questioned by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Vigfusson (2004) on
the basis that hours worked should enter the SVAR in levels rather than ﬁrst-diﬀerences. Imposing
the same long-run restrictions as in Gal´ ı to identify the technology shock, they show that hours
rise in response to a positive technology shock with hours in levels in the SVAR.
Fernald (2007) attempts a reconciliation of these apparently conﬂicting results. He combines the
log-level and log-diﬀerence of per capita hours with statistically and economically signiﬁcant trend
breaks in productivity and ﬁnds that the results are much less sensitive to the speciﬁc treatment
of hours in the SVARs: hours worked systematically decline following a technology improvement.
Drawing the distinction between neutral technology and investment-speciﬁc technology shocks,
Fisher (2006, Figure 7) looks at the eﬀects of both types of shocks on hours worked. Using a SVAR
approach with long-run restrictions identifying the two types of technology shocks, he reports
evidence for the years 1955:I to 1979:II of a statistically signiﬁcant short-run decline of hours
worked in response to positive innovations in both types of shocks. His ﬁndings are robust to
alternative speciﬁcations for hours, whether hours worked are measured in levels, ﬁrst-diﬀerences
or are detrended in the SVAR. The evidence is somewhat less conclusive for the years 1982:III
to 2000:IV, as he ﬁnds that the impulse responses of hours are either statistically insigniﬁcant or
negative.
Francis and Ramey (2005) present evidence about real wage adjustment following a technology
shock. They use a SVAR approach where long-run restrictions help identify the technology shock.
6They show that in the wake of a one-percent positive technology shock, the real wage increases by
only 0.4 percent and then gradually rises to its new long-run level. Basu, Fernald and Kimball (2006)
report similar evidence about real wages using their ”puriﬁed” measure of aggregate technology
change.
Going a step further, Liu and Phaneuf (2007) estimate SVARs with long-run identifying restric-
tions and examine how the real wage responds to a technology shock depending on the treatment of
hours worked in the SVAR. They conclude that whether hours are in levels or ﬁrst-diﬀerences, the
real wage modestly rises on impact of a positive technology shock, and continues rising thereafter.
To conclude this section, we present evidence summarizing the consensus view about the ef-
fects of technology shocks on hours and the real wage. We estimate a four-variable SVAR model
that includes the log-diﬀerence of labor productivity, the log-diﬀerence of nominal wages, the log-
diﬀerence of nominal prices and the log-diﬀerence of per capita hours. Our sample of data, which
is quarterly, covers the period 1949:II to 2003:IV. The technology shock is identiﬁed as the only
disturbance aﬀecting the long-run level of labor productivity. The results are displayed in Figure
1. The ﬁgure also displays the 95% conﬁdence bands (the shaded areas) estimated from the SVAR
model. Following a positive one-percent technology shock, hours decline persistently, with an initial
response of −0.4%. The real wage on impact of the positive technology shock increases by 0.3%,
and continues rising until reaching a permanently higher steady state level.
The evidence presented in this section suggests that hours decline persistently following a posi-
tive one-percent technology shock, while the real wage increases modestly on impact, and continues
rising until reaching a permanently higher steady state level.
3 Technology Shocks in a Real Business Cycle Model With Habit
Formation
This section examines an RBC model augmented with habit formation.5 Habit formation slows the
adjustment of consumption and thus helps generate a decline in labor hours following a positive
technology shock (e.g., Francis and Ramey, 2005). However, the RBC model with habit formation
fails to generate the observed gradual rise in real wages.
5We do not consider investment adjustment costs since our model abstracts from capital accumulation, both our
main arguments would remain the same with costly investment adjustment.






log(Ct − b ¯ Ct−1) − V (Nt)
]
, (1)
where β ∈ (0,1) is a subjective discount factor, Ct is the household’s individual consumption, ¯ Ct is
aggregate consumption, Nt is labor hours, and b > 0 measures the importance of habit formation.
Suppose, for simplicity, that the production technology takes the form Ct = AtNt, where At is a
technology shock and follows a random walk process so that
At = At−1exp(εt), (2)
where εt is a mean-zero, iid normal process, with a ﬁnite variance σ2
a.
The optimal labor-leisure decision implies that
V ′(Nt)(Ct − bCt−1) = wt, (3)
where wt denotes the real wage. In equilibrium, the real wage equals the marginal product of labor.
Thus, we have
V ′(N)(AtNt − bAt−1Nt−1) = At.
Dividing through by At and using the technology shock process, we obtain
V ′(N)[Nt − bNt−1exp(−εt)] = 1, (4)
This equation gives a unique solution for labor hours in equilibrium. In the special case with no habit
formation (i.e., with b = 0), a technology shock has no eﬀect on hours since under our preference
and technology speciﬁcations (log-utility in consumption and constant returns technology), the
income eﬀect and the substitution eﬀect exactly oﬀset. With habit formation (i.e., with b > 0),
Eq. (4) shows that a positive technology shock leads to a decline in hours on impact. Thus, an
RBC model augmented with habit formation is capable of generating the observed contractionary
employment eﬀect of technology shocks.6
In this example, the real wage rises one-for-one with the technology shock (since wt = At). In
contrast, in the data, the real wage rises modestly on impact and continues to increase until reaching
a permanently higher steady state. In a more general RBC model with capital accumulation
and investment adjustment costs such as the one studied by Francis and Ramey (2005), one can
still obtain a decline in labor hours. However, the real wage in that model overshoots its steady
6With capital accumulation and without habit formation, hours will rise following a positive technology shock.
But still, if real frictions are strong enough, hours will fall.
8state level on impact. Thus, although an RBC model with real rigidities can potentially explain
the contractionary eﬀects of technology shocks on employment, it has diﬃculties explaining the
observed responses of real wages following a technology shock.
4 The Transmission of Technology Shocks in the Sticky-Price Model
This section presents a stylized monetary business-cycle model with sticky prices and examine the
model’s predicted eﬀects of technology shocks on hours and the real wage.
4.1 The Model Economy
The economy is populated by a large number of identical, inﬁnitely-lived households, and a large
number of ﬁrms, each producing a diﬀerentiated product. The representative household is endowed
with one unit of time and derives utility from consumption, real money balances, and leisure time.
The consumption good is a composite of the diﬀerentiated products. Production of each type of
diﬀerentiated good requires labor as the only input and is subject to a productivity shock. While
the labor market is perfectly competitive, the goods market is monopolistically competitive. Firms’
pricing decisions are staggered in the spirit of Calvo (1983), although our main results do not hinge
upon this speciﬁc form of price rigidity.
4.1.1 The Representative Household







− V (Nt)], (5)
where E is an expectations operator, β ∈ (0,1) is a subjective discount factor, Ct denotes consump-
tion, Mt/Pt denotes real money balances, and Nt denotes labor hours.
In each period t, the household faces a budget constraint
PtCt + Mt + EtDt;t+1Bt+1 ≤ WtNt + Πt + Mt−1 + Bt − Tt, (6)
where Pt is the price level, Wt is the nominal wage rate, Πt is a claim to all ﬁrms’ proﬁts, and Tt is a
lump-sum tax. The term Bt+1 denotes the holdings of a one-period state-contingent nominal bond
that pays one unit of currency in period t+1 if a particular event is realized, Dt;t+1 is the period-t
price of such a bond divided by the probability of the appropriate state, so that EtDt;t+1Bt+1 is
the total cost of state-contingent bonds.










where Yt(j) denotes the output of type-j good and εp > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between
diﬀerentiated products. The household’s expenditure-minimization problem results in a demand














Solving the household’s utility-maximization problem results in a labor supply equation, an
intertemporal Euler equation, and a money demand equation, given respectively by
Wt
Pt
= V ′(Nt)Ct, (9)
















4.1.2 Firms and Optimal Price-Setting
A good of type j ∈ [0,1] is produced using labor as the input, with a production function given by
Yt(j) = AtNt(j), (12)
where At denotes a productivity shock that is common to all ﬁrms, and Nt(j) is the homogeneous
labor used by ﬁrm j. The shock follows the stochastic process described in Eq (2).
Firms are price-takers in the input markets and monopolistic competitors in the product mar-
kets. They set prices in a staggered fashion in the spirit of Calvo (1983). In particular, in period t,
all ﬁrms receive an iid random signal that determines whether or not they can set a new price. The
probability that ﬁrms can adjust prices is 1 − αp. By the law of large numbers, a fraction 1 − αp
of ﬁrms can set new prices in any given period.
If ﬁrm j can set a new price in period t, it chooses a price Pt(j) to maximize an expected present





p Dt;[Pt(j) − V]Y d
 (j), (13)
10where V = W/A is the unit production cost, and Y d
 (j) is the demand schedule described in (8).
Solving the proﬁt maximizing problem results in an optimal pricing decision rule
P∗












where µp = εp/(εp − 1) measures the steady-state markup. The optimal price is thus a markup
over a weighted average of the marginal costs in the current and future periods during which the
price is expected to remain in eﬀect.
Solving the cost-minimizing problem of ﬁrm j yields the demand for labor Nd
t (j) = Y d
t (j)/At.














0 [Pt(j)/Pt]−"pdj measures price dispersion. Thus, if the rise in aggregate demand
cannot catch up with productivity improvement, the aggregate demand for labor will fall.
4.1.3 Monetary Policy
Following Gal´ ı (1999), we assume that the monetary authority is allowed, but not required to
adjust the growth rate of money stock in response to changes in productivity shocks. Speciﬁcally,
we assume
µt = (1 − ρ)¯ µ + ρµt−1 + γεt, (16)
where µt = log(Ms
t /Ms
t−1) denotes the growth rate of money supply, ¯ µ is the mean money growth,
and γ ̸= 0 implies a systematic response of monetary policy to technology shocks.
4.1.4 Equilibrium
Given the monetary policy described in (16), an equilibrium consists of allocations Ct, Nt, Bt+1,
and Mt for the representative household; allocations Yt(j) and Nt(j), and price Pt(j) for producer
j ∈ [0,1]; together with prices Dt;t+1, ¯ Pt, and wage Wt, that satisfy the following conditions: (i)
taking the prices and the wage as given, the household’s allocations solve its utility maximizing
problem; (ii) taking the wage and all prices but its own as given, each producer’s allocations
and price solve its proﬁt maximizing problem; and (iii) markets for bonds, money, labor, and the
composite goods clear.
We focus on a symmetric equilibrium in which all ﬁrms who can adjust prices in a given period
make identical pricing decisions. Thus, we do not have to keep track of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc index j
and we can write the pricing decisions as P∗
t in place of P∗
t (j).
114.2 The Sticky-Price Channel
We now examine the sticky-price channel for the transmission of technology shocks. We examine,
both analytically and numerically the responses of hours and real wages following a technology
shock.
4.2.1 Theoretical Properties of the Sticky-Price Model
We ﬁrst examine the theoretical properties of the sticky-price model for the adjustment of hours
and the real wage following a technology shock and we assess the plausibility of these theoretical
implications in light of the empirical evidence we have discussed earlier in the paper. In the next
subsection, we evaluate the model’s performance along these dimensions under empirically plausible
values of the parameters.
For our purpose, we consider small shocks so that the equilibrium conditions can be approxi-
mated by log-linearizing around a zero-inﬂation steady state.7 Further, for analytical convenience,
we set ρ = 0 in the money growth rule (16), so that deviations of the money growth rate from its
steady state level is proportional to productivity growth. Or equivalently, given that the produc-
tivity shock follows a random walk process, so does the money stock under the assumption that
ρ = 0. This allows us to characterize the equilibrium dynamics using a closed-form solution. We
relax this assumption when we assess the quantitative implications of the sticky-price model in the
next subsection.
We begin with the Phillips-curve relation obtained from log-linearizing the optimal pricing
decision rule (14)
πt = βEtπt+1 + κp(ct − ¯ ct), (17)
where lower-case variables denote the log-deviations of the upper-case variables from steady state,
πt = pt − pt−1 denotes the inﬂation rate, ¯ ct = at is the natural rate of output. The parameter
κp = λp(1 + η) determines the response of real marginal cost to changes in output, where η =
V ′′(N)N/V ′(N) is the inverse labor-supply elasticity and λp = (1−βαp)(1−αp)/αp is the elasticity
of pricing decisions with respect to real marginal cost. Note that κp increases with η, the inverse
labor supply elasticity. A smaller labor supply elasticity implies a larger value of η and thus a
larger κp, so that the marginal cost is more responsive to changes in aggregate demand, and there
is less endogenous nominal price rigidity.
Next, we log-linearize the intertemporal money demand decision (11) to obtain
pt + ct = (1 − β)mt + βEt(pt+1 + ct+1). (18)
7Allowing for positive steady-state inﬂation does not change the qualitative results (not reported).
12Under our assumption that ρ = 0 in the monetary policy rule (16), the money supply follows a
random-walk process, as does the technology shock. Then, (18) reduces to
pt + ct = (1 − β)
∞ ∑
j=0
βjEtmt+j = mt. (19)
Note that, this apparently static aggregate demand relation is not an ad hoc assumption, but rather
an equilibrium outcome. It is obtained under the assumptions of separable period-utility function,
log-utilities in consumption and real money balances, and the random-walk property of money
stocks inherited from the technology shock process.
The system of equilibrium conditions (17) and (19), along with the monetary policy rule mt =
γat can be combined to obtain a solution for the dynamics of the price level. This is given by
pt = θppt−1 + (1 − θp)(γ − 1)at. (20)
where θp is the stable root of the quadratic polynomial βθ2−(1+β +κp)θ+1 = 0. Thus, the price
level falls on impact of a positive technology shock as long as γ < 1. A larger θp implies greater
strategic complementarity in ﬁrms’ pricing and thus more persistence in the price (and inﬂation)
dynamics and a smaller response of the price level (and of inﬂation) to technology shocks.
Given the solution for pt, we obtain the solution for ct by using (19). It then follows from
nt = ct − at that the solution for employment is given by
nt = θpnt−1 + (γ − 1)θpεt. (21)
Therefore, as stated by Gal´ ı (1999), a technology improvement leads to a fall in employment if and
only if γ < 1. Further, for a larger value of θp, employment becomes more persistent and, for any
given γ ̸= 1, more responsive to the technology shock.
As a point of departure from Gal´ ı (1999), we also examine the response of the real wage to a
technology shock. Using the method of undetermined coeﬃcients, we obtain the initial response of
the real wage on impact of a technology shock which we denote ω0:
ω0 = 1 − θp(1 + η)(1 − γ). (22)
The impact eﬀect of a technology shock on the real wage is thus ambiguous, depending on the pa-
rameter values. The real wage falls on impact if monetary policy accommodation to the technology
shock is weak (i.e., γ is small), the Frisch elasticity of hours is small (i.e., η is large), or the strategic
complementarity is strong (i.e., θp is large).
Thus, in response to a positive technology shock, the stickiness in price-setting implies sluggish-
ness in output adjustment as long as γ is relatively small. For a small value of γ, output adjustment
13cannot catch up with the technology improvement, leading to a lower demand for labor at any given
real wage. The lower demand for labor puts a downward pressure on the equilibrium real wage.
Since ct rises, there is also an income eﬀect on labor supply that tends to oﬀset the fall in the real
wage, so that the net eﬀect is ambiguous. Speciﬁcally, the net eﬀect on the real wage depends
on the strength of the income eﬀect (that depends negatively on the endogenous price stickiness
measured by θp and positively on the degree of monetary policy accommodation measured by γ)
relative to that of the substitution eﬀect (that depends positively on the curvature coeﬃcient of
the labor supply curve η).
For plausible parameter values, as we show below, the real wage indeed falls along with em-
ployment in the sticky-price model. As the price level falls (for γ < 1), the decline in the real wage
after the shock implies an even stronger decline in the nominal wage, making it diﬃcult for the
sticky-price model, by itself, to explain the modest rise in the real wage on impact of the technology
shock.
4.2.2 Calibration
We now assess the quantitative predictions of the sticky-price model under empirically plausible
parameter values. We ﬁrst consider a set of baseline calibrated parameters, and then examine the
robustness of the results.
The parameters to be calibrated include β, the subjective discount factor; αp, the Calvo proba-
bility of price non-reoptimization; εp, the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerentiated products;
η, the inverse elasticity of labor supply; and the monetary policy parameters ρ and γ. The calibrated
values are summarized in Table 1.
Since we have a quarterly model in mind, we set β = 0.99 so that the steady state annual real
interest rate is 4 percent. We set αp = 0.75 so that the average duration of the price contracts is 4
quarters. The parameter εp determines the steady-state markup of prices over marginal cost, with
the markup given by µp = εp/(εp − 1). Recent studies by Basu and Fernald (2002) suggest that
the value-added markup, controlling for factor capacity utilization rates, is about 1.05; whereas
without any utilization correction, the value-added markup is about 1.12. Some other studies
suggest a higher value-added markup of about 1.2 (without corrections for factor utilization) (e.g.,
Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997). Since we do not focus on variations in factor utilization, in light
of these studies, we set εp = 10 so that µp = 1.1. The parameter η corresponds to the inverse labor
supply elasticity. Most empirical studies suggest that this elasticity is small and lies well below one,
so that η is above one. We set η = 2 as a benchmark value and also consider a range of η between
1 and 5, corresponding to a labor supply elasticity in the range between 0.2 and 1, consistent with
14evidence on the elasticity of labor supply obtained from micro data (e.g., Pencavel, 1986).8 For the
purpose of illustration, we set ρ = 0.6 and γ = 0 as a benchmark. In our sensitivity analysis, we
allow γ to vary in the broad range between 0 and 1.
Figure 2 plots the impulse responses of hours and the real wage following a positive technology
shock under the calibrated parameters. Evidently, the real wage falls along with employment. The
fall in hours is supported by empirical evidence, but the decline in the real wages is not.
Figure 3 plots the impact eﬀects of the shock on hours and the real wage as the policy parameter
γ varies from 0 to 1 and the inverse labor supply elasticity η varies from 1 to 5. The ﬁgure reveals
that the sticky-price model consistently predicts the fall in hours under all conﬁgurations of these
parameters. The impact eﬀect on the real wage is more ambiguous. Consistent with our analytical
solutions, the impact eﬀect on the real wage tends to be more negative if γ is small or η is large.
Given the smallest value of η we consider plausible (i.e., η = 1), the sticky-price model is able to
generate a rise in the real wage if γ is about 0.3 or higher. However, to be able to generate an
initial increase in the real wage of about the size we have documented in the section 2, γ would
have to be at least 0.5. With a higher η, γ would have to be even higher, so that monetary policy
would be quite accommodative to the technology shock. We provide in section 6 empirical evidence
about the extent of accommodation of monetary policy to the technology shock.
5 The Role of Nominal Wage Rigidities
We now introduce sticky nominal wages in the model and examine the sticky-wage channel in the
transmission of technology shocks.
We assume that the labor market, like the goods market, is monopolistically competitive. There
is a continuum of households, each endowed with a diﬀerentiated labor skill indexed by i ∈ [0,1],
with a utility function similar to (5) (with all variables in the utility function indexed by i).
Production of goods requires a composite labor as the input, and is subject to a productivity










where εw > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerentiated skills. Solving ﬁrms’ cost-








8The results are robust even when we extend the lower bound of  to 0:5 (not reported).
15where Wt(i) is the nominal wage for a type i labor skill, and Wt is the wage index that is related





In each period, each household receives an iid random signal that enables it to adjust its nominal
wage with probability 1 − αw, taking the demand schedule for labor skill (24) as given. It follows
from the law of large numbers that, in each period, a fraction 1 −αw of all households can set new
wages. The optimal wage decision rule is given by
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where µw = εw/(εw − 1) measures the steady-state wage markup, and MRS = V ′(N)C denotes
the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption. The optimal wage is thus a
constant markup over a weighted average of the MRS’s in the current and future periods during
which the wage is expected to remain in eﬀect.
We focus on log-linearized equilibrium conditions around a zero-inﬂation steady state. In the
model with both sticky prices and sticky wages, the equilibrium conditions are summarized below:
πt = βEtπt+1 + λp˜ ωt, (26)
πwt = βEtπw;t+1 +
λw
1 + ηεw
[(1 + η)˜ ct − ˜ ωt], (27)
˜ ωt = ˜ ωt−1 + πwt − πt − ∆at, (28)
(1 − β)(˜ ct − ˜ mt) = βEt(πt+1 + ∆˜ ct+1), (29)
∆˜ mt = µt − πt − ∆at, (30)
along with the monetary policy rule (16). In these expressions, πwt = wt − wt−1 denotes the wage
inﬂation rate, ˜ ωt denotes the real-wage gap, ˜ ct denotes the output gap, ˜ mt denotes the real-balance
gap, and λw = (1 − βαw)(1 − αw)/αw is a parameter that determines the responsiveness of wage-
setting decisions to the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption. Equations
(26) and (27) are derived from optimal price- and wage-setting decisions and are sometimes known
as the price-Phillips curve and the wage-Phillips curve, respectively. Equation (28) describes the
law of motion of the real-wage gap. Equation (29) is derived from the money demand relation.
Finally, (30) describes the law of motion of the real-balance gap.
5.1 The Sticky-Wage Channel
To examine the potential ability of the model with nominal wage rigidity in explaining the evidence
about the response of hours and the real wage to a technology shock, we consider various degrees
16of price rigidity. We begin with the extreme case of perfectly ﬂexible price decisions (i.e., αp = 0).
In this case, the pricing decision is given by pt = wt − at, so that the real wage rises one-for-one
with the technology shock, and the real-wage gap is closed. The sharp increase in the real wage is
inconsistent with the evidence of a much smaller percentage increase in the real wage following a
technology shock.
To help obtain the equilibrium dynamics of hours, the price level, and the nominal wage, we
assume that the monetary authority follows the money growth rule (16) and that ρ = 0.
First, since the real-wage gap is closed under ﬂexible prices, we can rewrite the wage-Phillips
curve relation (27) as
πwt = βEtπw;t+1 + κw(ct − at). (31)
where κw = λw(1 + η)/(1 + ηεw). Using the pricing decision equation pt = wt − at, this equation
can be rewritten in terms of price inﬂation:
πt + ∆at = βEt(πt+1 + ∆at+1) + κw(ct − at).
Solving for the price level, we obtain
pt = θwpt−1 + (1 − θw)(γ − 1)at − θw∆at, (32)
where θw ∈ (0,1) is the stable root of the quadratic polynomial βθ2 −(1+β +κw)θ+1 = 0. Given
the solution for pt, we use the aggregate demand relation (19) to obtain ct, and the production
function to obtain nt. The solution for hours is given by
nt = θwnt−1 + θwγεt. (33)
Thus, with perfectly ﬂexible prices and sticky nominal wages, the hours response to technology
shocks is non-negative as long as γ ≥ 0. A pure sticky-wage cannot be consistent with the evidence
of a short-run decline in hours worked following a positive technology shock.
We conclude that the sticky-wage model’s predicted adjustment in the real wage does not
align well with the empirical evidence. In the data, the real wage rises modestly on impact, and
continues rising thereafter until reaching the new steady state. In the model, the real wage rises
instantaneously to the new steady state on impact of the shock. This problem occurs mainly
because price adjustments are assumed to be perfectly ﬂexible. Moreover, the sticky-wage model
fails to generate a fall in hours when technology improves.
5.2 The Joint Implications of Sticky Wages and Sticky Prices
We now consider the more general case with some price rigidity along with the nominal wage
rigidity. In this case, the equilibrium dynamics are the solution to the system of equilibrium
17conditions (26)-(30), along with the monetary policy rule (16). To solve the model, we use the
calibrated parameter described in the previous section, and calibrate two additional parameters
that are unique to nominal wage rigidity: we set αw = 0.75 so that the average duration of nominal
wage contract is four quarters, as suggested by empirical evidence (e.g., Taylor (1999)), and εw = 4,
so that a 1 percent rise in relative nominal wages would result in a 4 percent fall in relative hours
worked, in light of the microeconomic evidence presented by Griﬃn (1992, 1996) (see also Huang
and Liu (2002)). Again, we consider η = 2 and γ = 0 as a baseline calibration.
Figure 4 examines the initial responses of hours worked and the real wage as η varies in the
range between 1 and 5 and γ in the range between 0 and 1. With both sticky wages and sticky
prices, a positive technology shock is always followed on impact by a modest increase in the real
wage, whether the Frisch elasticity of labor supply and the degree of policy accommodation are
high or low. The initial percentage increase in the real wage is quite consistent with the empirical
evidence we have reported in section 2. The inability of a pure sticky-wage model to generate the
observed decline in hours might be overcome by combining sticky wages with sticky prices, but
then the extent of policy accommodation matters. With weak policy accommodation, hours fall
when technology improves, while if policy accommodation is relatively high, hours rise.
In light of the microeconomic evidence that prices change fairly frequently, we also consider
a shorter price-contract duration of 2 quarters as well as the standard calibration of 4 quarters.
Figure 5 plots the impulse responses of hours and the real wage following a positive technology
shock, with various degrees of price rigidity. In the extreme case where price decisions are perfectly
ﬂexible, hours does not change as we have shown analytically. When prices adjust once every 2
quarters on average, hours falls. Increasing the duration of price contracts to 4 quarters magniﬁes
the fall in hours. The response of the real wage stays positive as we vary the degrees of price
rigidity, although the initial response is more dampened as the length of price contracts increases.
In this sense, the model with nominal wage rigidity, along with some price rigidity, is potentially
more successful than a RBC model augmented with real frictions, a pure sticky-price model or a
pure sticky-wage in explaining the evidence about the adjustment of hours and the real wage to a
technology shock.
6 The Extent of Monetary Accommodation
Since the predictions of both the sticky-price model and the model with sticky wages and sticky
prices depend on how accommodative monetary policy is, it is important get a sense of how large
γ has been during the postwar period. That is, how accommodative was U.S. monetary policy
18to technology shocks? One way to answer this question is to examine the relation between the
growth rate of a measure of U.S. money aggregates and an appropriate measure of technology
shocks. Without loss of generality, we use M2 as a measure of U.S. money aggregate, with a
sample period from 1959 to 2003 (at monthly frequency). This series is obtained from the FRED
II database published by the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank. We use two alternative measures
of technology shocks. The ﬁrst measure is constructed by Gal´ ı and Rabanal (2004) with a sample
period from 1950 to 2002 (at quarterly frequency), and the second is the “puriﬁed” technology
measure constructed by BFK (2006), which has a sample period from 1949 to 1996 (at annual
frequency).9
Figure 6 presents scatter plots of M2 growth rate and the two alternative measures of technology
shocks, with appropriate data frequencies and sample periods. The plots suggest a weak correlation
between the money growth rate and the technology measures. In other words, γ is likely to be small.
To obtain a formal estimate of γ, we run an OLS regression of the M2 growth rates on the
technology shock series. In particular, we estimate the monetary policy rule speciﬁed in (16),
which, for ease of reference, is rewritten here:
µt = (1 − ρ)¯ µ + ρµt−1 + γεt. (34)
Using Gal´ ı-Rabanal’s technology measure, the point estimates are ˆ ρ = 0.61(0.06) and ˆ γ = 0.10(0.05),
where the numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Using the BFK measure produces point
estimates of ˆ ρ = 0.60(0.14) and ˆ γ = 0.13(0.33). It appears that the estimates for γ are small and
may even be statistically insigniﬁcant. This also provides the basis for our baseline calibration of
γ = 0.10
Going back to Figure 3, which plots the impact eﬀects of technology shocks on hours and real
wages in the sticky-price model, we see that even if we use the higher point estimate of γ = 0.13,
the response of the real wage is still negative for all values of η. On the other hand, going back
to Figure 4, which plots the impulse responses in the benchmark model with sticky prices and
nominal wages, we see that the impact responses of hours and real wage are broadly consistent
with empirical evidence for plausible values of γ.
7 Conclusion
Ever since the seminal work of Lucas and Rapping (1969), accounting for ﬂuctuations in employment
and the real wage has been considered a decisive test for macroeconomic models. We have taken up
9We are grateful to Susanto Basu and Jordi Gal´ ı for kindly providing us with the data.
10We have also used M1 data in the regression and obtained very similar results (not reported).
19this challenge from the perspective of a DSGE model driven by productivity (neutral technology)
shocks. Our main message is clear: neither the standard RBC model nor a RBC model augmented
with real frictions passes this test, but a DSGE model featuring both nominal wage and nominal
price rigidities does.
Put in the broader context of current research with DSGE models, our ﬁndings could have
other important implications. For a long time, macroeconomists have considered that certain types
of models were better suited for the analysis of certain types of shocks. RBC models for which
nominal rigidities had little practical relevance were believed to be the main vehicle from which the
transmission of technology shocks could be analyzed. On the other hand, New Keynesian models
built around nominal rigidities were thought to be particularly useful to improve our understanding
of the monetary transmission mechanism.
We believe the ﬁndings presented in this paper regarding the transmission of productivity
shocks and those from the recent DSGE literature on monetary transmission speak of a single
voice. Working from a money-driven DSGE model, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005)
have shown that nominal wage and nominal price rigidities are both important to understand the
macroeconomic eﬀects of monetary policy shocks: with sticky prices only, the eﬀects of a monetary
policy shock on output are weak at best, while with sticky wages only, an expansionary policy shock
is followed by a sharp decline of inﬂation that lasts about a year. Therefore, the research program
on monetary policy and productivity shocks has now come full circle: nominal rigidities matter to
understand the sources of business cycle ﬂuctuations.
References
Basu, Susanto and Fernald, John G. “Aggregate Productivity and Aggregate Technology.”
European Economic Review, June 2002, 46(6), pp. 963-991.
Basu, Susanto; Fernald, John G. and Kimball, Miles S. “Are Technology Improvements
Contractionary?” American Economic Review, December 2006, 96(5), pp. 1418-1448.
Bils, Mark and Klenow, Peter J. “Some Evidence on the Importance of Sticky Prices.” Journal
of Political Economy, October 2004, 112(5), pp. 947-985.
Calvo, Guillermo A. “Staggered Contracts in a Utility-Maximizing Framework.” Journal of
Monetary Economics, 1983, 12, pp. 383-398.
Christiano, Lawrence J., Eichenbaum, Martin and Vigfusson, Robert. “What Happens
After A Technology Shock?” Mimeo, Northwestern University, August 2004.
20Fernald, John. “Trend Breaks, Long-Run Restrictions, and the Contractionary Eﬀects of Tech-
nology Shocks.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 2007, 54, pp. 2467-2485.
Fischer, Stanley. “Long-term Contracts, Rational Expectations, and the Optimal Money Supply
Rule.” Journal of Political Economy, 1977, 85, pp. 191–205.
Fisher, Jonas D.M. “The dynamic eﬀects of neutral and investment-speciﬁc technology shocks.”
Journal of Political Economy, 2006, 114, pp. 413-451.
Francis, Neville and Ramey, Valerie. “ Is the Technology-Driven Real Business Cycle Hy-
pothesis Dead? Shocks and Aggregate Fluctuations Revisited.” Journal of Monetary Economics,
2005, 52, pp. 1379–1399.
Gal´ ı, Jordi. “Technology, Employment,and the Business Cycle: Do Technology Shocks Explain
Aggregate Fluctuations?” American Economic Review, March 1999, 89(1), pp. 249-271.
Gal´ ı, Jordi and Rabanal, Pau. “Technology Shocks and Aggregate Fluctuations: How Well
Does the RBC Model Fit Postwar U.S. Data?” NBER Macreoconomics Annual, 2004.
Gal´ ı, Jordi, Smets, Frank and Wouters, Rafael. “Unemployment in an Estimated New
Keynesian Model.” 2011, Working paper, Pompeu Fabra.
Gray, Jo Anna. “Wage Indexation: A Macroeconomic Approach.” Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, 1976, 2, pp. 221–235.
Griﬃn, Peter. “The Impact of Aﬃrmative Action on Labor Demand: A Test of Some Implications
of the Le Chatelier Principle.” Review of Economics and Statistics, 1992, 74, pp. 251-260.
Griﬃn, Peter. “Input Demand Elasticities for Heterogeneous Labor: Firm-Level Estimates and
An Investigation Into the Eﬀects of Aggregation.” Southern Economic Journal, 1996, 62, pp.
889-901.
Huang, Kevin X.D. and Liu, Zheng “Staggered Price Setting, Staggered Wage Setting, and
Business Cycle Persistence.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 2002, 49, pp. 405-433.
Ireland, Peter N. “A New Keynesian Perspective on the Great Recession.” Journal of Money,
Credit, and Banking, 2011, 43(1), pp. 31-54.
Justiniano, Alejandro and Primiceri, Giorgio E. “The Time-varying Volatility of Macroeco-
nomic Fluctuations.” American Economic Review, 2008, 98(3), pp. 604-641.
Klenow, Pete and Kryvtsov, Oleksiy. “State-Dependent or Time-Dependent Pricing: Does It
Matter for Recent U.S. Inﬂation?” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2008, 123, pp. 863-904.
Kydland, Finn E. and Prescott, Edward C. “Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations.”
Econometrica, 1982, 50, pp. 1345-1370.
Liu, Zheng and Phaneuf, Louis. “Technology Shocks and Labor Market Dynamics: Some
Evidence and Theory.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 2007, 54, pp. 2534-2553.
21Liu, Zheng, Waggoner, Daniel and Zha, Tao. “Sources of Macroeconomic Fluctuations: A
Regime-Switching DSGE Approach.” Quantitative Economics, 2011 (forthcoming).
Lucas, R.E. Jr. and Rapping, Leonard. “Real Wages, Employment and Inﬂation.” Journal
of Political Economy, 1969, 77, pp. 721-754.
Nakamura, Emi and Steinsson, Jon. “Five Facts About Prices: A Reevaluation of Menu Cost
Models”. Mimeo, Columbia University, May 2008, forthcoming Quarterly Journal of Economics.
Pencavel, John. “The Labor Supply of Men: A Survey.” in: O. C. Ashenfelter and L. Richard,
eds., Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 1, North-Holland:Elsevier Science, 1986, pp.3-102.
Phelps, Edmund S. and Taylor, John B. “Stabilizing Powers of Monetary Policy Under
Rational Expectations.” Journal of Political Economy, 1977, 85, pp. 163–190.
Prescott, Edward C. “Response to a Skeptic.” Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis, 1986, 10, pp.28-33.
Rotemberg, Julio J. and Woodford, Michael. “An Optimization-Based Econometric Frame-
work for the Evaluation of Monetary Policy.” NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 1997, pp. 297–
346.
Shapiro, Matthew D. and Watson, Mark W. “Sources of Business Cycle Fluctuations.”
NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 1988, pp. 111-148.
Smets, Frank and Wouters, Rafael. “Shocks and Frictions in US Business Cycles: a Bayesian
DSGE Approach.” American Economic Review, 97, pp. 586–606.
Summers, Lawrence H. “Some Skeptical Observations on Real Business Cycle Theory.” Quar-
terly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 1986, 10, pp.23-27.
Taylor, John B. “Aggregate Dynamics and Staggered Contracts.” Journal of Political Economy,
1980, 88, pp. 1-23.
Taylor, John B. “Staggered Price and Wage Setting in Macroeconomics.” in: J. B. Taylor and M.
Woodford, eds., Handbook of macroeconomics. Amsterdam, North Holland: Elsevier Science,
1999, Vol. 1B, pp. 1009-1050.
22Table 1.
Calibrated parameter values
Preferences: η = 2, β = 0.99
Nominal contract duration: αp = 0.75, αw = 0.75
Elasticities of substitution: ϵp = 10, ϵw = 4
Money growth rule: ρ = 0.60, γ = 0




Hours                 




Real wage             
Figure 1: Impulse responses of hours and real wages to a positive technology shock in the data.













































































Figure 3: Impact eﬀects of a positive technology shock on hours and real wages in the sticky-price














































Figure 4: Impact eﬀects of a positive technology shock on hours and real wages in the benchmark
model with sticky prices and nominal wages for various values of the Frisch elasticity of labor hours
(η) and monetary-policy accommodation (γ).







































Figure 5: Impulse responses of hours and real wages to a positive technology shock in the benchmark
model with sticky prices and nominal wages.




















































































Figure 6: Money growth rate and technology shocks. The upper panel is a scatter plot of the M2
growth and the BFK (2006) technology shock (annual frequency, 1960-1996). The lower panel is a
scatter plot of the M2 growth and the Gali-Rabanal (2004) technology shock (quarterly frequency,
1960:Q1 - 2002:Q4). The solid lines are the linear ﬁts.
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